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ABSTRACT
This article aimed to investigate whether corporate governance uses tax management to increase companies’ performance. The objective 
was checking whether corporate governance characteristics, such as remuneration paid to the executive board, segregation between Chair-
man and CEO, and the independence and composition of the Board of Directors, influence tax management in Brazilian companies. At 
the same time, it aimed to identify whether the preceding tax management is reflected on the subsequent tax management. To do this, a 
sample of 355 Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA between 2008 and 2014 was used, in order to find out whether their cor-
porate governance characteristics influenced tax management, something identified by calculating ETR, CashETR, and BTD. As a result, it 
was found (i) that the remuneration paid to executives may be regarded as a characteristic influencing tax management in Brazilian firms, 
and (ii) that the preceding tax management influences the future tax management. In addition, it was found that Brazilian companies do 
not rule out tax management benefits, since the average effective rate in the sample under analysis was 25%, and it is statistically lower than 
the nominal rate of taxes on earnings in Brazil, which is 34%.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
rate structures or invest in tax havens that do not require 
accounting information. Thus, it gives room for managerial 
opportunism, i.e. within complex and obscure structures 
managers have opportunities to pursue interests of their 
own to the detriment of shareholders’ interests. An exam-
ple of this practice was reported by Desai and Dharmapala 
(2007) regarding the conclusions by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) in the ENRON case. According to this 
Committee, the fraud at ENRON had as its initial goal tax 
savings. However, such planning was used to mask losses 
and thus cheat thousands of investors around the world. 
The Enron case demonstrates how tax management can 
provide ideal environments for managerial opportunism. 
Second, tax management involves significant uncertainties, 
since it must be executed before the taxable event so that 
it does not characterize tax avoidance, i.e. tax crime. Thus, 
the benefits of tax management may fail to occur.
Therefore, knowing how corporate governance will 
work to (i) mitigate risks for a complex and obscure tax 
management and (ii) contribute so that the benefits of tax 
management take place provides some understanding to 
shape corporate governance practices in order to lead the 
company to achieve the shareholders’ main goal, i.e. in-
creased firm value. Also, Brazil has experienced an actual 
growth of the stock market, where more and more inves-
tors employ their savings in publicly traded corporations. 
Accordingly, the agency problem risk increases and it must 
be discussed. Another aspect that deserves attention is tax 
management in companies, as the Brazilian tax legislation 
complexity, coupled with the increased expenses on taxes, 
may encourage companies to manage their taxes, giving 
room to managerial opportunism.
According to the manuals on good corporate gover-
nance practices by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM) (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, 
2002) and the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governan-
ce (IBGC) (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corpora-
tiva, 2011), a company can boost its performance, as well 
as bring benefits to the whole society, by adopting inter-
nal and external mechanisms to ensure that corporate de-
cisions are made in the best interest of investors, in order 
to maximize the probability that resource providers have a 
return on their investment.
To do this, one of the main internal mechanisms that 
these manuals propose refers to the Board of Directors, 
which, according to Silveira (2002), plays a key role in 
companies’ corporate governance, therefore it is the main 
internal mechanism to reduce agency costs between sha-
reholders and managers, as well as between controlling and 
minority shareholders.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the decision-
-making process of senior management involves four sta-
ges, two of which should be the sole responsibility of the 
Board: ratification of relevant decisions and monitoring of 
senior management. In this way, according to the manu-
As noticed by Desai and Dharmapala (2007), concer-
ning the study by Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means on 
the agency problem (The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, 1932), the latter arises when shareholders name 
managers who can pursue interests of their own at the ex-
pense of shareholders’ interests. According to Desai and 
Dharmapala, the authors were inspired by the role of taxes 
in the diffusion of property in the U.S. economy, and this 
was due to high tax rates on estate and the need for funding 
after the First World War, which resulted in property segre-
gation among the U.S. companies. The agency problem has 
emerged along with this separation between owners and 
managers, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La 
Porta and Vishny (2000), and it is solved by adopting good 
Corporate Governance practices.
According to Silveira (2004), studies involving the theme 
corporate governance have as their main concern demons-
trating the increased companies’ performance by adopting 
the principles of corporate governance. On the other hand, 
according to Minnick and Noga (2010), these studies are 
not concerned in checking how increased performance is 
obtained. Therefore, in order to verify which are the tools 
used by corporate governance to boost corporate perfor-
mance, this research examines whether companies seek to 
increase their performance by reducing expenses on taxes 
on earnings (Brazilian income tax on legal entities – IRPJ 
and Brazilian social contribution on earnings – CSLL) and 
whether this is motivated by corporate governance practi-
ces adopted by companies.
It is believed that the increased performance of a com-
pany can be reached through tax management, understood 
as a legal way of reducing expenses on taxes, when tax-
payers identify opportunities in laws to decrease compa-
nies’ tax burden (Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2005; Tang, 
2005; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Formigoni, Antunes, & 
Paulo, 2009; Minnick & Noga, 2010; Tang & Firth, 2010).
Many studies (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008; Robinson, Sikes, & Weaver, 
2010; Armstrong, Blouin, & Larcker, 2011) report that 
tax management may be measured through three proxies: 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR), Cash Effective Tax Rate (CashE-
TR), and Book-Tax Differences (BTD). It is understood as 
ETR the result of dividing expenses on taxes on earnings 
by company’s earnings before taxes on earnings; so, ETR is 
the effective tax rate on company’s profit. In turn, CashETR 
is the effective tax rate taking only paid taxes into account, 
without deferred taxes and analyzing in the long term. 
And, finally, BTD is the difference between book earnings 
and taxable earnings, considering that, if the latter is smal-
ler than the former, there is evidence of tax management.
Given this preliminary context, the link between tax 
management and corporate governance is discussed for 
two reasons. First, tax management can be complex and 
obscure, i.e. in order to obtain an effective tax management 
the company may be encouraged to adopt complex corpo-
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als on corporate governance by the CVM (2002) and the 
IBGC (2011), the Board of Directors should be indepen-
dent and there must be segregation between the president 
of the Board of Directors (Chairman) and the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO), in order to enable the Board to play its 
role of effectively monitoring the executive board, contri-
buting to maximize companies’ performance.
The aforementioned manuals propose that the Board 
of Directors consists of few members, technically qua-
lified, ranging from five to nine participants. This sug-
gestion is derived from the organizational behavior the-
ory, which reports a productivity decline as the working 
groups increase. In this way, according to Jensen (2001), 
Boards with a large number of members are less likely to 
work effectively, becoming more easily controlled by the 
executive director. In addition, several studies (Yerma-
ck, 1996; Brown & Maloney, 1999; Eisenberg, Sundgren 
& Wells, 1998; Füerst & Kang, 2000) have demonstrated 
that smaller Boards are more efficient and they provide 
companies with better returns.
In addition the Board of Directors, a way to mitigate 
the agency problem is through incentive contracts, which 
aim to establish rewards and punishments to managers 
and thus align managers’ interests to shareholders’ inte-
rests. In this way, a partial solution to the issue of exe-
cutives’ residual control right is providing managers with 
an ex-ante long-term incentive, which align executives’ 
interests to investors’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 2008).
Fama (1980) shows that incentive contracts can take a 
variety of forms, including property distribution, options 
to purchase stocks, or threat of dismissal if performance is 
bad. On the other hand, according to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), the main issue of incentive contracts is that they 
create a huge potential for managers’ extra earnings, e.g. 
earnings from profits already known or goals already met.
Anyway, several studies (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; 
Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Rego & Wilson, 2010; 
Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2011) 
have shown a strong link between the executive board 
remuneration and tax management, showing a negative 
relationship between increased executive board remune-
ration and the effective tax rates on companies’ earnings.
Thus, it is believed that the composition of the Board 
of Directors, its members’ independence, segregation be-
tween the president (chairman) and the chief executive 
officer (CEO), and the proper design of executive board 
remuneration contracts are corporate governance cha-
racteristics that can (i) influence the increased corporate 
performance, by reducing expenses on taxes, (ii) avoid 
agency problems in situations where tax management 
enables managerial opportunism, and (iii) avoid the un-
certainty of benefits from tax management, minimizing 
the allocation of resources in dubious tax management.
Given the above, this research problem has been pre-
pared: Corporate governance characteristics, such as 
executive board remuneration, segregation between 
Chairman and CEO, the independence and composi-
tion of the Board of Directors, as well as tax manage-
ment in preceding years, influence tax management in 
Brazilian companies?
 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
2.1   Aspects Related to Tax Management
According to the literature reviewed by Graham (2003), 
taxes are one of the many factors influencing decision-
-making in companies, especially with regard to investment 
and funding policies. Given this fact, Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2007) report that shareholders are interested to reduce the 
burden of taxes in order to increase company value.
Tax management, tax administration, tax planning, and 
tax avoidance are defined as a legal way of reducing expen-
ses on taxes, when taxpayers identify opportunities in the 
laws to decrease companies’ tax burden (Armstrong et al., 
2011; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Formigoni et al., 2009; 
Minnick & Noga, 2010; Tang & Firth, 2010; Goncharov & 
Zimmermann, 2005).
Therefore, tax management seeks, through legal ways 
and among the opportunities observed in tax legislation, 
to reduce the current value of companies’ taxes in order 
to increase their performance and, as a consequence, their 
market value (Machado, 2011). In this vein, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) report that tax management is a legal 
transfer of State resources to companies with a view to in-
crease their performance, by reducing expenses on taxes. 
As a result, many researchers have shown that tax mana-
gement is a valuable activity for shareholders (Bankman, 
1999; Graham & Tucker, 2006; Desai & Dharmapala, 2007; 
Frank et al., 2009; Wilson, 2009).
According to Scholes and Wolfson (1992), there is a 
need to consider all aspects involved in business and not 
only taxes to make tax management effective. In this way, 
the conceptual structure developed by the authors revolves 
around three central themes (known as all parties, all taxes, 
and all costs):
a) An effective tax planning requires the planner to take 
into account the tax implications of a transaction proposed 
for all parties involved in the transaction (all parties). 
b) An effective tax planning requires the planner, when 
making investments and financial decisions, to take into 
account not only explicit taxes, value paid directly to the 
authorities, but also implicit taxes, value paid indirectly in 
the form of lower return rates before taxes on encouraged 
investments (all taxes). 
c) An effective tax planning requires the planner to re-
cognize that taxes represent only one among many business 
costs, and all of them must be considered in the planning 
process; to be implemented, some proposals require costly 
restructuring procedures (all costs).
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Therefore, it is clear that the central theme in the struc-
ture developed by Scholes and Wolfson (1992) is that the 
effective tax management must take into account (i) tax im-
plications for all parties involved in the transaction, (ii) all 
taxes, either explicit or implicit, and (iii) all costs involved 
in the issue.
According to these authors, although taxes represent a 
significant burden on companies’ cost structure and, the-
refore, require due attention, decision-making to reduce 
companies’ tax burden may not be based only on the legal-
-fiscal perspective. Checking all variables involved in tax 
management is important so that the intended goal and 
gain are achieved, regardless of their nature, fiscal or non-
-fiscal.
Finally, the authors highlight that increasing companies’ 
performance is more important than reducing companies’ 
tax burden, because what really matters is maximizing 
company value (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992). Therefore, tax 
management must have as its primary premise increasing 
company value in the long term.
Studies related to tax management usually seek to con-
nect fiscal management to certain company’s attributes, 
such as profitability, foreign operations level, intangible as-
sets, expenses on research and development (R&D), leve-
rage, and aggressive financial reporting. Some examples of 
these studies are Gupta and Newberry (1997), Rego (2003), 
Graham and Tucker (2006), Frank et al. (2009), and Wilson 
(2009).
In this paper, the aim is identifying whether corpora-
te governance characteristics adopted by companies, such 
as independence of the Board of Directors, the number of 
members in this Board, segregation between Chairman 
and CEO, and variable remuneration influence tax mana-
gement. In this line of research, evidence is mixed, accor-
ding to results obtained by Phillips (2003), Hanlon (2005), 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006), and Armstrong et al. (2011).
Several studies (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et 
al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2011) re-
port that tax management may be measured through three 
proxies: Effective Tax Rate (ETR) Cash Effective Tax Rate 
(CashETR), and Book-Tax Differences (BTD). It is unders-
tood as ETR the result of dividing expenses on taxes on 
earnings by company’s earnings before taxes on earnings, 
thus ETR is the effective tax rate on company’s profit. In 
turn, CashETR is the effective tax rate taking only paid ta-
xes into account, without deferred taxes and analyzing in 
the long term. To do this, it is highlighted that this variable 
was obtained by adding the expenses registered in compa-
nies’ results over the past 10 years and dividing this value 
by earnings before taxes on earnings, within the same 10-
year period. Expenses registered in the result were taken 
into account, because they are the counterparts of tax liabi-
lities registered in the short term and settled by March 31 
of the subsequent year, according to the Brazilian Income 
Tax Regulations (Decree 3,000/1999). So, these are the va-
lues actually paid by companies. And, finally, BTD is the 
difference between book earnings and taxable earnings, if 
the latter is smaller than the former, there is evidence of tax 
management.
Through these proxies, studies sought to determine 
whether there was a relationship between variable remu-
neration and tax management, and in many of these pa-
pers there was a significant negative relationship between 
remuneration and the proxies to identify tax management 
- ETR, CashETR, and BTD. This leads to the conclusion 
that remuneration influences directly tax management, de-
monstrating that proper design of variable remuneration 
contracts is one of the great corporate governance tools 
to mitigate the agency problem and incentives to increase 
companies’ performance, by reducing income taxes.
In this way, Phillips (2003) reports that managers seek 
tax management to achieve their goals and thus increase 
their remuneration. Providing the same conclusion, Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) notice there is a significant nega-
tive relationship between increases in the executive board 
variable remuneration and the proxy BTD to identify tax 
management. In addition, the authors report that the nega-
tive effect observed also stems from corporate governance 
characteristics adopted by the company. According to the 
authors, companies having weak corporate governance are 
more likely to tax management when the executive board 
variable remuneration increases.
In the same vein, Rego and Wilson (2010) examined 
variable remuneration as one determinant of tax manage-
ment. Based on prior research, they concluded that varia-
ble remuneration led administrators to take more risks in 
investment and funding decisions, provided that risk in-
creased their variable remuneration. The authors identified 
a relationship between variable remuneration and the tax 
management proxies BTD and CashETR. However, they 
did not identify the same association with corporate gover-
nance characteristics, such as independence of the Board 
of Directors and segregation between Chairman and CEO.
Dyreng et al. (2010) analyzed 908 business executives 
between the years 1992 and 2006, in order to verify whe-
ther these managers promoted an incremental effect on 
tax management in their companies, since such manage-
ment could not be explained by the company characteris-
tics. They noticed that executives play a significant role in 
determining companies’ tax avoidance level. The authors 
identified a significant impact between these managers and 
the two tax management proxies used in the study - ETR 
and CashETR.
In the paper by Minnick and Noga (2010), addressing 
the role of corporate governance in tax management, the 
authors identified that variable remuneration of executive 
directors and the CEO have a strongly negative relationship 
with the tax management proxies ETR and CashETR. 
Every dollar added to the executives’ wealth accounts for 
1.94% less in ETR and 4.13% less in CashETR. Therefore, 
the authors conclude that remuneration is the best cor-
porate governance tool to encourage tax management in 
companies. Besides, they also noticed that small Boards of 
Directors are more prone to tax management held abroad, 
while companies with large Boards and independent mem-
bers focus on domestic tax management, i.e. within their 
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own country.
Armstrong et al. (2011) analyzed whether executives’ 
variable remuneration directly related to tax management 
led them to focus on tax management. As a result, the au-
thors identified a strongly negative relationship between 
the remuneration of these executives and the ETR. Howe-
ver, they did not find the same relationship with regard to 
the CashETR.
2.2   Corporate Governance, Agency Problem, and 
Player Remuneration
Corporate governance began in the USA as a way to 
fight the expropriation of shareholders by executive ma-
nagers, i.e. it emerged as a response to several records 
of misuse of shareholder’s wealth by managers. Indeed, 
the authors classify corporate governance as the set of 
mechanisms through which outsider investors (sha-
reholders or creditors) protect themselves against expro-
priation by insider investors (executives or controlling 
shareholders). Therefore, corporate governance aims 
to ensure that resources allocated by investors will not 
be spent by executive managers in activities that do not 
bring them the best return (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta & Vishny, 2000).
On the core of the discussion of corporate governance 
lies the agency problem that, as claimed by Jensen and 
Meckling (2008), is characterized by the conflict of inte-
rests between investors (the principal) and executive ma-
nagers (the players), when the latter work in their own 
interest at the expense of shareholders’ aspirations. In 
this vein, given the information asymmetry, the player, 
aware that his actions are not fully known by the sha-
reholder, can use company resources with less zeal than 
the shareholder. Therefore, the essence of the agency pro-
blem is the conflict of interests made possible by separa-
tion of ownership and control and it refers to investors’ 
difficulties to ensure that their funds are not expropriated 
or lost in unattractive projects.
To fight this opportunism, there emerge costs to 
align managers’ interests to shareholders’ interests. Such 
agency costs are classified by Jensen and Meckling (2008) 
into four types: the costs of generating incentives or ou-
tline behavior (bonding), monitoring costs (monitoring), 
signaling costs (signaling), and residual losses (residual 
loss). The first type derives from efforts to restrict player’s 
choices, by encouraging him to behave according to a 
standard and warning him to expect punishment when 
deviating from such a standard. The second type is related 
to monitoring efforts by the principal to break with the 
information asymmetry, in order to provide the player 
with a sense of control. Considering the cost-benefit ra-
tio of control and return, there is a point where it is not 
worth expending more effort to control players; so, these 
losses are acceptable, i.e. residual losses (Cardoso, Mário 
& Aquino, 2007).
Thus, the concern of Corporate Governance is fi-
ghting the agency problem, creating an effective set of 
mechanisms, both incentives and monitoring, in order 
to ensure that executives’ behavior is always aligned to 
shareholders’ interests. Thus, good governance provides 
owners (shareholders or unit holders) with strategic ma-
nagement of their company and monitoring of executive 
administration.
To ensure this goal, executives and shareholders sign 
a contract that specifies what managers should do with 
company resources. Ideally, managers should sign a full 
contract specifying exactly what to do every moment and 
how excess cash flow should be allocated, in every pos-
sible contingency. The issue is that players have limited 
knowledge, so many contingencies are difficult to des-
cribe and predict, making it clear that full contracts are 
technically unfeasible. Due to difficulties in their develo-
pment, investors have to delegate residual control rights 
to managers, i.e. they have the right to make decisions 
under circumstances not provided for in the contracts. 
This situation, in line with information asymmetry, gi-
ves rise to an incorrect executives’ behavior, considering 
their personal interest.
However, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 
310), “[...] a partial solution to the issue of executives’ 
residual control rights is giving them a long-term ex-ante 
incentive to align their interests to investors’ interests.” 
Fama (1980) demonstrates that incentive contracts can 
take a variety of forms, including property distribution, 
options to purchase stocks, or threat of dismissal if per-
formance is bad.
In this line, there is extensive literature linking se-
nior executives’ remuneration to company performance 
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), 
and many of these papers have related the composition 
and influence of the Board to executives’ remunera-
tion (Lambert, Larcker & Verrecchia, 1991; Boyd, 1994; 
Hallock, 1997). There are also several studies that oppose 
remuneration to fiscal management, by checking whe-
ther remuneration encourages tax management (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 
2010; Armstrong et al., 2011).
In this regard, the studies sought to confirm whether 
there is a relationship between variable remuneration 
and tax management, and in many of them there was a 
significant negative relationship between remuneration 
and proxies identifying tax management, such as ETR, 
CashETR, and BTD (Armstrong et al., 2011; Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et al.,  2010; Minnick & Noga, 
2010; Phillips, 2003; Rego & Wilson, 2010).
In addition to remuneration, the studies on corpora-
te governance establish that the Board of Directors is a 
major internal mechanism to solve the agency problem, 
because it acts as a link in the relations between sharehol-
ders and managers and between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders (Jensen, 1993).
Jensen (1993) characterizes the Board of Directors 
as a major internal monitoring mechanism to protect 
owners’ interests. According to Silveira (2002), several 
market players even associate the term “corporate gover-
nance” to the active and independent role of the Board of 
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Directors. In fact, when analyzing the history of corpora-
te governance, it is noticed that the Board of Directors, as 
well as its independence from the beginning, was highli-
ghted as the main internal mechanism to reduce agency 
costs between shareholders and managers and, as a con-
sequence, to improve company performance.
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) cite three func-
tions of the Board of Directors: control, consultancy, and 
identification of resources. Regarding control, the Board 
acts as an internal body of the company responsible for 
monitoring directors, and it represents, within the com-
pany, owners’ aspirations. In this role, the responsibilities 
of the Board of Directors include hiring and firing the 
CEO and other executives. Moreover, it is up to the Board 
establishing executives’ remuneration and punishment 
and ensuring that shareholders are not expropriated by 
senior managers (Monks & Minow, 1995). As for consul-
tancy, the Board plays an advising role towards directors, 
recommending and confirming strategies to achieve the 
organization’s goals. And, finally, according to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), the Board also plays the role of resource 
finder aiming at company’s success.
The widespread idea that the main function of the 
Board is monitoring company management and that 
only external professional counselors can be effective 
monitors has led most governance codes to emphasize 
the need for a Board of Directors made up of a majori-
ty of members external to the company (non-executive, 
independent), in order to improve decision-making and 
increase company value (Silveira, 2002).
Following this line of thought, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that the inclusion of professional external 
directors increases the Board effectiveness and reduces 
the likelihood of collusion of senior executives to expro-
priate shareholders’ wealth. However, there is a conflict 
of views on how the independence of the Board affects 
companies’ monitoring and performance.
The literature on corporate governance also shows 
that the composition of the Board, regarding the num-
ber of independent members, is related to mitigation of 
agency problems (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Borokovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996; 
Yermack, 1996; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999). In 
fact, this literature has shown that large Boards with few 
independent counselors had more agency problems. On 
the other hand, companies with small Boards and a gre-
ater number of external members might be safeguarded, 
because in this case the Board would be rather concerned 
about shareholders’ well-being improved company per-
formance.
Based on this view, several studies tried to relate the 
independence of the Board of Directors to company 
performance. According to Silveira (2002), the question 
to be answered in these surveys was “[...] does a Board 
made up of a majority of external members (non-execu-
tive) increase company performance?” To answer it, re-
searchers examined the correlation between accounting 
performance measures and the proportion of counselors 
external to the Board, and some results were conflicting 
(Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988; Baysinger & 
Butler, 1985; Bhagat & Black, 2000; Hermalin & Weis-
bach, 1991; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Agrawal & Knoe-
ber,1996).
Bhagat and Black (2000) found a significant rela-
tionship between the composition of the Board and 
corporate performance, noticing that the Boards of U.S. 
companies with a majority of independent members 
behave differently from the Boards without such a ma-
jority, and some of the differences seem to contribute to 
increase company value, while others seem to contribute 
to its reduction. However, contrary to what is advocated 
by most corporate governance codes, these authors state 
there is convincing evidence that the greater indepen-
dence of the Board, represented by a majority of non-
-executive company counselors, is correlated to increa-
sed company profitability or faster growth.
According to Bhagat and Black (2000), there is no 
empirical support to claim that companies whose Boards 
have more independent members show a better perfor-
mance. On the contrary, the authors state there is eviden-
ce that companies whose Board has a majority of inde-
pendent members are less profitable, since they showed a 
worse performance when compared to other companies 
in the study.
However, by contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
think there is a tendency for companies that have gone 
through difficulties to include independent members in 
the Board in order to improve their performance. Thus, 
the authors state that the correlation between composi-
tion of the Board and corporate performance tends to 
make companies with a higher proportion of members 
external to the Board to look worse, given the correlation 
between the proportion of external counselors and poor 
historical performance.
Anyway, Bhagat and Black (2000) claim that compa-
nies with an independent majority may even perform 
better in some specific tasks, such as replacing the CEO, 
but they perform worse in other tasks, leading to a non-
-significant net advantage in general performance. In 
conclusion, the study suggests it is interesting to include 
a moderate number of internal and external members in 
the Board of Directors.
In this vein, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) notice 
that the Board of Directors may vary according to com-
pany characteristics, since, in their study, complex com-
panies have large Boards with more external members, 
something which contributes to their strategies. On the 
other hand, simple companies have smaller Boards with 
few independent members.
Yermack (1996), in turn, found a significant negati-
ve correlation between the proportion of independent 
counselors and Tobin’s Q, the same finding obtained by 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996).
Other studies provide clues of a negative curviline-
ar relationship between performance and proportion of 
independent counselors, suggesting that some Boards 
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may have too many independent members. One of the-
se studies is Wagner, Stimpert and Fubara (1998), which 
shows evidence of a curvilinear relationship with a ne-
gative coefficient between the composition of the Board 
and return on assets (ROA). The study suggests that Bo-
ards with a balanced proportion between executives and 
non-executives perform better. The authors emphasize, 
however, that this correlation disappears when return 
on equity (ROE) is used as a performance measurement. 
Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) also found a curvilinear 
relationship with a significant negative coefficient betwe-
en Tobin’s Q and the proportion of independent mem-
bers in the Board, and they claim that companies with 
highly independent Boards have lower value, confirming 
the conclusions by Bhagat and Black (2000).
The studies by MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana and Peck 
(1983), Baysinger and Butler (1985), and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) are also noteworthy, which simply did 
not find any significant relationship between the com-
position of the Board of Directors and corporate perfor-
mance measurements.
In Brazil, research on companies’ independence and 
performance were strongly influenced by the U.S. me-
thodology. The most detailed research on this theme was 
conducted by Mônaco (2000), who analyzed 647 compa-
nies registered by the CVM, using data for the year 1996.
By relating the literature highlighted to the question 
to be answered in this research, independent counselors 
may provide useful knowledge derived from their expe-
rience to the CEO and the other executives, in order to 
advise them to concentrate their efforts on fiscal manage-
ment as a way to increase companies’ overall performan-
ce. Thus, herein, it is assumed that independent coun-
selors may be more willing to employ resources in fiscal 
management as a way to ensure a good performance.
In addition to the Board, internal mechanisms such as 
the remuneration system and the ownership of stocks by 
executives, and external mechanisms, such as the disclo-
sure of periodic information on the company, the presen-
ce of a market for hostile takeovers, and the existence of a 
competitive job market, are also important to reduce the 
agency problem (Silveira, Barros & Famá, 2003).
This research examines corporate governance con-
cerning four aspects, namely: composition and indepen-
dence of the Board of Directors, size (number of Board 
members), segregation between Chairman and CEO, and 
executives’ remuneration.
2.3   Research Hypotheses 
Through the research question six hypotheses were 
formulated, based on the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and tax management, adop-
ted by companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The 
research hypotheses tested were:
(H1) The companies listed at the various corpora-
te governance levels on the BM&FBOVESPA (Level 1, 
Level 2, and New Market) are those having better fiscal 
management, as a consequence, they are those having 
lower ETR and CashETR indexes, as well as positive 
BTD figures. 
(H2) The specific corporate governance levels on the 
BM&FBOVESPA (Level 1, Level 2, and New Market) 
have a significant negative relationship with the proxies 
to identify tax management ETR, CashETR, and BTD. 
(H3) The number of members in the Board of Di-
rectors in the preceding year contributes to tax ma-
nagement in firms, so the number of counselors has a 
significant relationship with the proxies to identify tax 
management ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H4) Independent Boards of Directors are more effi-
cient concerning fiscal management, as they recommend 
the executive board to invest resources in such activities, 
so the number of independent counselors in the prece-
ding year has a significant negative relationship with the 
proxies to identify tax management ETR, CashETR, and 
BTD.
(H5) Companies with segregation between Chair-
man and CEO are more efficient concerning fiscal ma-
nagement, so this dummy has a significant negative re-
lationship with the proxies to identify tax management 
ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H6) Companies that adopt executive board variable 
remuneration are more efficient concerning fiscal ma-
nagement, so executive board remuneration has a signi-
ficant negative relationship with the proxies to identify 
tax management ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H7) Tax management in the preceding period is re-
flected on tax management within the subsequent pe-
riod, so the dependent variables to identify tax manage-
ment ETR, CashETR, and BTD lagged one year have a 
significant relationship with the proxies to identify tax 
management.
 3   METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
3.1   Research Type and Method
As pointed out by Watts and Zimmermann (1986), the 
accounting theory aims to explain and predict accounting 
practice. In this sense, this research may be characterized 
as theoretical and empirical, as it seeks to explain tax ma-
nagement and predicts such management by identifying 
characteristics that influence it. Thus, the research is divi-
ded into two major groups, one having an exploratory and 
another having an explanatory nature.
The first group, exploratory, seeks to better explain tax 
management, because, according to Salomon (1973), ex-
ploratory research aims to better define the problem, i.e. 
become familiar with the phenomenon under study. Ac-
cording to Mattar (1999), exploratory research is useful 
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when people are aware of the study theme, promoting gre-
ater understanding and establishing priorities.
The second group, explanatory, people try to identify 
which are the corporate governance characteristics adop-
ted by Brazilian companies that influence tax management 
by increasing their performance. To do this, hypotheses 
were formulated through existing theories that have been 
tested by using regression models with panel data.
In addition, research is characterized as quantitative by 
employing descriptive statistics and statistical analysis. Re-
garding research strategy, bibliographic and documentary 
research were used. Concerning the data collection tech-
nique, there was a documentary research of financial state-
ments of companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA, using 
the Economatica database to identify, (i) companies’ net 
profit before taxes, (ii) expenses on earnings (current and 
deferred), and (iii) companies’ leverage degree. Besides, 
there was a detailed examination of the Reference Forms 
published by companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA, 
according to the CVM Normative Instruction 480/2009. It 
is noteworthy that these forms have collected information 
on corporate governance characteristics, such as segrega-
tion between Chairman and CEO, the number of indepen-
dent members in the Board of Directors, total number of 
members in the Board of Directors, and variable remune-
ration paid to the executive board.
3.2   Measurements to Identify Tax Management: 
ETR, CashETR, and BTD
According to the literature on calculation of the effec-
tive tax rate (ETR), the ETR is commonly used to mea-
sure tax management, since it calculates the effective rate 
of the tax paid by companies (Stickney & McGee, 1982; 
Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Callihan, 1994; Mills, Erickson, 
& Maydew, 1998; Petroni & Shackelford, 1999; Gupta & 
Mills, 2002; Yin, 2003; Rego, 2003; Phillips, 2003; Minni-
ck & Noga, 2010; Armstrong  et al., 2011).
According to several researchers (Callihan, 1994; Mills 
& Newberry, 2001; Shackelford & Shevlin, 2000; Tang, 
2005; Formigoni et al., 2009; Comprix, Mills & Schmidt, 
2011; Minnick & Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2011), an-
nual ETR is defined as the percentage obtained by divi-
ding the total expenditure on taxes on earnings by earnin-
gs before IRPJ of a given company i in year t:
          1
          2
where ‘Income Taxes’ is the sum of expenses on IRPJ 
and CSLL for the current and deferred year, and ‘LAIR’ is 
company profit before IRPJ.
Therefore, to identify tax management in companies, 
the ETR of companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA was 
calculated between 2001 and 2014. It is noteworthy this re-
search regarded as companies practicing tax management 
those having ETR indexes statistically lower than nominal 
tax rates on earnings, which amount to 34% in Brazil.
In order to demonstrate that the effective rates identi-
fied by calculating the ETR are lower than normal tax ra-
tes on earnings, the signal test was applied to one sample 
in order to estimate the median value for population and 
compare it to a target value. Such non-parametric test was 
applied because the population addressed in this research 
does not have a normal distribution.
One-sample signal test is a non-parametric alternative 
to one-sample t-test because it does not require that data 
come from a normally distributed population, as required 
by t-test. Besides, a 1-sample signal test has no assumptions 
on population symmetry.
This research also estimated the Cash Effective Tax Rate 
(CashETR) as an additional means to identify tax manage-
ment in Brazilian companies.
According to Dyreng et al. (2008), the CashETR consi-
ders actually paid taxes, since they take into account, along 
with due tax, extraordinary payments and realized remu-
neration, thus becoming a proxy with better disposition to 
measure long-term tax avoidance in companies.
According to these authors, to calculate the CashETR 
two modifications are made in the calculation of the ETRS. 
The first and most important is measuring the effective 
long-term tax rates, i.e. ten years. The second is that, to do 
so, a company taxes are added over a 10-year period and 
then divided by the sum of their total earnings before ta-
xes, over the same ten years. This produces an effective tax 
rate that better follows up the long-term tax burden of a 
company.
In addition, to calculate the CashETR only realized tax 
payments are considered, excluding deferred taxes, due to 
tax differences, because what is sought is identifying the ac-
tual tax burden paid on earnings.
Thus, following Dyreng et al. (2008), the CashETR was 
calculated this  way:
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where ‘Taxespd’ represent the sum of IRPJ paid and CSLL 
for the year, and ‘LAIR’ is earnings before IRPJ.
It is noteworthy that, for identifying taxes paid by 
companies, only the current expenses on taxes were con-
sidered, as they represent the counterparts of tax liabi-
lities registered in the companies and settled, according 
to the tax legislation, until the last day of March in the 
subsequent year.
Also, in order to highlight the difference between the 
proxy CashETR and the nominal tax rate on earnings, a 
1-sample signal test was applied.
Besides the calculation of these two proxies (ETR and 
CashETR), as an additional way to identify tax manage-
ment, the Book Tax Differences (BTD) was calculated, 
which, according to the literature, is the difference be-
tween book earnings and taxable earnings. Therefore, 
the BTD refers to the difference between book earnings 
reported in the financial statements and the taxable ear-
nings reported to the tax authorities through ancillary 
liabilities.
According to the CPC 32, companies are required to 
make a reconciliation between book earnings and taxable 
earnings, demonstrating in a note all factors that detach 
book earnings from taxable earnings.
Therefore, the companies’ BTD was calculated throu-
gh the notes, dividing expenses on taxes on earnings by 
0.34 (percentage related to tax rates on earnings within 
the period under analysis) and, out of this value, earnin-
gs were decreased before taxes on earnings. It is worth 
noticing that, between 2008 and 2014, the BTD was cal-
culated for financial companies by dividing these compa-
nies’ expenses on taxes on earnings by 0.40 (percentage 
related to tax rates on earnings of financial companies, 
since April 2008).
          3
To demonstrate that taxable earnings were lower than 
book earnings, 1-sample signal test was also applied, assu-
ming as null hypothesis that taxable earnings were equal 
to book earnings.
3.3   Sample Selection and Processing 
The target population of this study consisted of 670 com-
panies, according to information available on the website of 
the BM&FBOVESPA on November 5, 2011. However, tho-
se companies that had no data for any variable under study 
(LAIR, IRPJ, Deferred Taxes, Assets, Indebtedness) were 
excluded from this population, i.e. companies which did 
not allow calculating the proxies under analysis between 
2001 and 2014 were excluded. In addition, companies that 
have adopted internally generated goodwill were excluded, 
because this is regarded as an abusive tax planning practice. 
Thus, the study sample consists of 355 companies, whose 
representativeness based on total assets is 78%.
N Total Assets Percentual
Sample 355 25,490,814,374 78%
Population 670 32,573,002,815 100%
Figure 1 shows the sectoral classification of the com-
panies under study, as well as their division between 
the various segments of corporate governance on the 
BM&FBOVESPA. It is noticed that the sample is very hete-
rogeneous, insofar as it has companies from different sec-
tors and specific segments of corporate governance.
Figure 1   Sample composition by sector and specific segment
Segment Level 1 Level 2 New Market Traditional TOTAL
FOOD 1 5 6




TOYS AND LEISURE 2 2
TRADE 1 1 2 5 9
COMMUNICATION 1 1
CONSTRUCTION 1 5 8 14
REAL ESTATE CREDIT 2 2
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It is noteworthy that the analyses of corporate gover-
nance characteristics and tax management proxies were 
performed only for the years between 2008 and 2014, con-
sidering that the information on corporate governance stu-
died herein were made available only with the Reference 
Form, established by the CVM Instruction 480/2009.
3.4   Introduction to the Model and Description of 
Variables
The basic models used for the analysis are:
Figure 1   Continued
PACKAGING 1 1










MACHINES 2 2 3 9 16
METALLURGY AND 
STEEL-MAKING
6 1 17 24
MINING 1 2 3
PAPER AND CELLU-
LOSE
2 1 3 6
INVESTMENTS 1 3 4
OIL AND GAS 1 3 4









1 2 6 9
TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS
1 1 10 12
TEXTILE AND CLO-
THING
2 1 19 22
OTHERS 8 12 79 61 160
TOTAL  34  19  105  197  355 
Source: Prepared by the author.
          4
          5
          6
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Where:
ETR = Effective Tax Rate, which is a dependent varia-
ble in the model;
CashETR = Cash Effective Tax Rate, which is a depen-
dent variable in the model. It is worth noticing that this 
variable was obtained by summing expenses registered in 
the companies’ outcomes within the last 10 years. Expen-
ses registered in the outcomes were considered because 
they are the counterparts of tax liabilities registered in 
the short term, which were settled by March 31 of the 
subsequent year, according to the Brazilian Income Tax 
Regulations (Decree 3,000/1999);
BTD = Difference between book earnings and taxable 
earnings, which is a dependent variable in the model;
β’s = Angular coefficients estimated for each depen-
dent variable;
ETR-1 = Dependent variable lagged one year;
CASH-1 = Dependent variable lagged one year;
BTD-1 = Dependent variable lagged one year;
Log(REM) = Remuneration value paid to the execu-
tive board in the year subsequent to the calculation of 
dependent variables in the model. The natural logarithm 
of remuneration value paid was adopted for calculating 
the ETR and CashETR;
REM = Remuneration value paid to the executive bo-
ard in the year subsequent to the calculation of depen-
dent variables in the model. The remuneration value paid 
was adopted for calculating the BTD;
(COMP)2 = Number of members in the company Bo-
ard of Directors in the year preceding the calculation of 
dependent variables in the model, squared;
(INDEP)2 = Number of independent people in the 
Board of Directors in the year preceding the calculation 
of dependent variables in the model, squared;
SEGR = Binary variable representing the segregation 
between the president of the Board of Directors (Chair-
man) and the chief executive officer (CEO), where 1 
represents segregation and 0 the opposite, in the year 
preceding the calculation of dependent variables in the 
model;
GC = Binary variable indicating whether the company 
is listed on one of the specific segments of corporate go-
vernance on the BM&FBOVESPA (Level 1, Level 2, and 
New Market), where 1 represents presence in a specific 
segment and 0 for the opposite;
AT = Natural logarithm of the company total assets, 
representing company size;
Alav = The company leverage level.
 4   ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Below, the results obtained are interpreted according to 
each hypothesis defined in the research.
(H1)  The companies listed at the various corporate 
governance levels on the BM&FBOVESPA (Level 1, Level 
2, and New Market) are those having better fiscal mana-
gement, as a consequence, they are those with lower ETR 
and CashETR indexes, as well as positive BTD figures. 
Table 1 shows the ETR of companies in the sample be-
tween the years 2001 and 2014, separated into four seg-
ments on the BM&FBOVESPA.
Table 1   Effective Tax Rate by segment of the Stock Exchange
ETR Level 1 Level 2 New Market Traditional All Segments
Companies 34 19 105 197 355
2001 13% 180% 21% 26% 20%
2002 38% 23% 60% 27% 38%
2003 26% 51% 36% 28% 29%
2004 28% 28% 26% 30% 28%
2005 26% 40% 29% 28% 27%
2006 20% 35% 14% 29% 24%
2007 27% 33% 23% 30% 28%
2008 -23% 84% 23% 29% 12%
2009 31% 25% 25% 26% 28%
2010 24% 34% 27% 24% 25%
2011 12% 34% 31% 23% 21%
2012 23% 32% 29% 29% 27%
2013 39% 35% 23% 23% 27%
2014 29% 28% 26% 27% 27%
Total 22% 34% 26% 27% 25%
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It may be inferred from Table 1 that the average ETR 
of companies in the sample between the years 2001 and 
2014 was 25%. The segment that had the lowest effec-
tive tax rate was Level 1, with an average ETR of 22%, 
followed by the New Market, with an average ETR of 
26%. The segment with the highest average ETR was 
Level 2, with 34%, accompanied by the segment Tradi-
tional, with 27%.
Also, it is noteworthy that the average ETR for the 
year 2008 was 12%, mainly because of the negative 
ETR at Level 1 (-23%), something which contributed 
to reduce the average ETR in this segment (21%). This 
considerable decrease was due to the merger between 
ITAÚ and UNIBANCO, which generated tax benefits 
amounting to R$ 12 million, as highlighted in the notes 
by ITAÚSA - Investimentos ITAÚ S.A. (Note 15) and 
ITAÚ UNIBANCO Holding S.A. (Note 14). According 
to Roberto Egydio Setúbal (2008), president of ITAÚ, 
the merger between ITAÚ and UNIBANCO has gene-
rated significant premium that could be amortized on 
the calculation basis of IRPJ and CSLL.
Table 1 also shows that three out of the four seg-
ments under analysis showed an increased ETR, and 
Level 1 increased by 16 percentage points, representing 
a 123% positive variation. On the other hand, Level 2 
had a significant negative variation, with 84%, which 
means a decrease of 152 percentage points. The seg-
ment New Market had a 24% positive variation, with 
an increase of five percentage points. In turn, the seg-
ment Traditional had a positive variation of 4%, with 
an increase of one percentage point in the ETR. Such 
changes have led to a 35% positive variation in the 
companies’ total ETR within the period under analysis, 
making it increase by seven percentage points.
The result obtained in our research is contrary to 
that found by Yin (2003). In the study carried out by 
this author, the ETR calculated for a sample of U.S. 
companies decreased almost constantly between 1995 
and 2000, going from 28.85% in 1995 to 24.20% in 
2000, representing a 16% decline.
The result shown herein is also opposite to that 
shown in the study by McIntyre and Nguyen (2000), 
who analyzed 250 large U.S. companies between 1996 
and 1998. The authors identified a decreased num-
ber of companies whose effective tax rates were above 
30%, as they were 78 in 1996 and became 52 in 1998. 
In addition, the study showed an increased number of 
companies with effective rates below 30% within the 
same period, going from 97 to 104. The survey also 
showed a reduced effective tax rate in the companies 
under analysis, dropping from 22.9% in 1996 to 20.1% 
in 1998.
The ETR is criticized due to some drawbacks, such 
as: (i) it is calculated annually and, on that basis, its 
variations may lead the reader to make mistakes and 
they are also not consistent with tax management; (ii) 
its calculation takes into account deferred taxes, which 
may mask tax management, as companies can decrease 
the current tax, but increase it in the future, and this 
fact will be masked by adding deferred taxes; and (iii) 
variation in the ETR may occur due to factors unrela-
ted to tax management.
To overcome these drawbacks, Dyreng et al. (2008) 
proposed the Cash Effective Tax Rates - CashETR as 
another way to identify tax management, where expen-
ses on taxes on earnings are added in the long term 
and this value is divided by the sum of earnings wi-
thin the same period. This measure prevents variation 
in the effective tax rate due to values  unrelated to tax 
management.
Table 2 shows the CashETR of companies in the 
sample between 2001 and 2014, and the values dis-
played refer to the sum from 2001 to 2014, i.e. the year 
2001 is related only to taxes and earnings for 2001, 
2002 is related to taxes and earnings for 2001 and 2002, 
and so on, until 2014.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
2001-2014 Percentage Points 16 -152 5 1 7
2001-2014 Percentage 
Variation 123% -84% 24% 4% 35%
Table 1   Continued
Table 2   CashETR by segment
CashETR Level 1 Level 2 New Market Traditional All Segments
Companies 34 19 105 197 355
2001 16% 103% 35% 24% 22%
2002 42% -2% 75% 40% 53%
2003 28% 34% 37% 30% 30%
2004 27% 32% 27% 26% 27%
2005 25% 43% 30% 29% 28%
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It may be inferred from Table 2 that the segments ha-
ving the largest negative variations refer to companies in 
the sample listed on Level 2 and New Market, with 81% 
and 40% decreases, respectively. On the other hand, the 
segment Traditional increased by 108%, followed by Level 
1, with 63%. However, the average CashETR in Brazilian 
companies is 24%. In this estimate, New Market and Tradi-
tional were 25% and 24%, respectively.
Comparing this research with that by Dyreng et al. 
(2008), it is noticed that the CashETR (24%) in Brazilian 
companies listed on the sample is lower than that showed 
by the authors, which was 29.6%, i.e. 5.6 percentage points 
less than the CashETR in U.S. companies included in that 
sample.
According to Shevlin (2002), Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), Plesko (2004), McGill and Outslay (2004), Tang 
(2005), and Tang and Firth (2010), the BTD estimate is an 
effective way to identify tax management in companies, 
because if book earnings are higher than taxable earnings, 
there is evidence of tax management to reduce the calcula-
tion basis of taxes on earnings.
Therefore, if the difference between book earnings and 
taxable earnings is positive, there is an indication of the 
presence of tax management, because it demonstrates that 
book earnings are higher than the calculation basis of taxes 
on earnings.
Table 3 shows the BTD of companies in the sample be-
tween the years 2001 and 2010.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 2   Continued
2006 21% 30% 14% 29% 24%
2007 27% 35% 28% 30% 28%
2008 -18% 234% 43% 24% 13%
2009 31% 13% 41% 27% 31%
2010 23% 24% 26% 18% 21%
2011 14% 27% 24% 16% 17%
2012 26% 22% 21% 19% 22%
2013 44% 22% 18% 18% 25%
2014 26% 20% 21% 50% 27%
Total 23% 28% 25% 24% 24%
2001-2014 Percentage Points 10 -83 -14 26 5
2001-2014 Percentage 
Variation 63% -81% -40% 108% 23%
Table 3   BTD by segment (R$ million)
BTD Level 1 Level 2 New Market Traditional All Segments
Companies 26 7 26 136 195
2001 11,059 -597 1,459 4,387 16,308 
2002 -1,276 -1,069 -2,207 2,269 -2,283 
2003 6,377 -590 -663 6,174 11,298 
2004 8,274 235 2,788 5,501 16,798 
2005 13,392 -226 2,323 10,603 26,092 
2006 22,842 -77 9,136 10,373 42,274 
2007 19,768 90 6,406 7,856 34,120 
2008 84,363 -504 7,062 11,865 102,786 
2009 6,308 1,231 7,716 18,221 33,476 
2010 32,705 -31 12,251 35,479 81,845 
2011 71,846 -87 5,575 34,542 112,971 
2012 18,813 403 11,283 12,049 44,206 
2013 -9,944 -105 32,642 26,971 51,626 
2014 12,377 1,034 18,150 6,296 38,453 
Total 296,902 -291 113,920 192,588 609,971
BTD by company 11,419 -42 4,382 1,416 3,128 
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2001-2014 Difference 1,318 1,631 16,691 1,908 22,145
2001-2014 Percentage 
Variation
12% -273% 1,144% 43% 136%
2001-2014 Percentage 
Variation by company
3% -93% 200% -68% -81%
Source: Prepared by the author.
Table 3   Continued
According to Table 3, the total difference between book 
earnings and taxable earnings, between 2001 and 2014, was 
R$ 610 billion, and Level 1 was the most representative, 
with R$ 297 billion, followed by Traditional market, with 
R$ 192 billion, and New Market, with R$ 114 billion. Level 
2 showed a negative difference, i.e. taxable earnings were 
greater than book earnings in 2001, and in 2014 this was 
reversed, book earnings became greater than taxable ear-
nings.
Table 3 also shows a positive BTD evolution, i.e. a posi-
tive evolution of the difference between book earnings and 
taxable earnings, in all segments under analysis, something 
which means that all companies started having greater 
book earnings than taxable earnings. This fact may have 
been motivated by the separation between book earnings 
and taxable earnings since 2008, when the Brazilian Tran-
sition Tax Regime (RTT) was established, which deals with 
tax adjustments derived from the new accounting methods 
and criteria introduced by Law 11,638/2007, and by the ar-
ticles 36 and 37 of the Brazilian Provisional Act 449/2008, 
turned into articles 37 and 38 of Law 11,941/2009 and now 
repealed by Law 12,973/2014.
So, it is clear that within these 14 years the Brazilian 
companies in the sample did not ignore tax management, 
as in all segments there was a decrease in taxable earnin-
gs when compared to book earnings, something which 
demonstrates that the Brazilian companies under analysis 
have been constantly working to reduce taxable earnings in 
relation to book earnings.
However, the results reported herein reject (H1), i.e. 
companies listed on specific levels are more efficient in tax 
management, since the tests demonstrated, in short, that 
companies at specific corporate governance levels have a 
worse fiscal management for the ETR Index, the same ma-
nagement as for the CashETR Index, and better manage-
ment for the BTD Index.
Using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test, since 
the data under analysis do not have a normal distribution, 
as evidenced by applying the Anderson-Darling normality 
test, the results shown in Table 4 were obtained.
Table 4   Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test








ETR Level 1 0.2395 0.2611 -0.0121 -0.0365 0.0132 0.1725
ETR Level 2 0.3246 0.2611 0.07 0.0411 0.1022 0.0000
ETR New Market 0.2787 0.2611 0.0289 0.0109 0.0472 0.0007
CASH_ETR Level 1 0.2474 0.26335 -0.0007 -0.02369 0.477 0.477
CASH_ETR Level 2 0.2998 0.26355 0.032 0.00459 0.0601 0.0114
CASH_ETR New Market 0.232 0.26355 -0.025 -0.04211 -0.0078 0.0023
BTD Level 1 75,460 8,930 57,972 40,587 77,714 0.0000
BTD Level 2 3,123 8,930 -15,438 -32,689 -2,684 0.0067
BTD New Market 31,603 8,930 13,656 5,263 22,691 0.0008
Source: Prepared by the author.
Regarding the ETR Index, we may conclude that com-
panies listed at Level 1 have as their median value the same 
index that Traditional companies. In turn, those listed at 
Level 2 and New Market have higher median values for the 
index, when compared to Traditional companies.
For the CashETR Index, we notice that companies at 
Level 1 have the same median values than Traditional com-
panies. When compared to the latter, companies at Level 2 
have higher median values, and those at New Market have 
lower median values.
Regarding the BTD Index, only companies listed at Le-
vel 2 have lower median values than Traditional companies.
In short, companies at specific corporate governance 
levels have a worse fiscal management for the ETR Index, 
the same management as for the CashETR Index, and 
better management for the BTD Index.
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Anyway, the results shown herein demonstrate that 
Brazilian companies do not ignore the benefits of tax ma-
nagement, since the effective rate in the sample between 
2001 and 2014 was 25%, i.e. nine percentage points below 
the nominal tax rate on earnings (34%).
Besides, 1-sample signal test showed that the median 
values for the ETR and CashETR indexes are lower than 
the reference value 0.34, something which statistically 
shows that Brazilian companies do not ignore the benefits 
of tax management.
Table 5   Summary Table
Figure 2   Explanatory Variables
Table 6   Signal Test
ETR CashETR BTD
Level 1 = Traditional Level 1 = Traditional Level 1 > Traditional
Level 2 > Traditional Level 2 > Traditional Level 2 < Traditional
New Market > Traditional New Market < Traditional New Market > Traditional
Specific Level > Traditional Specific Level = Traditional Specific Level > Traditional
Variable Proxies Expected Signal
ETR-1; CashETR-1; BTD-1 Dependent variable lagged one year +
Rem
Variable remuneration paid to the executive board 




Number of members in the Board of Directors in 




Number of independent members in the Board of 




Segregation between Chairman and CEO in the 




Company listed on the specific corporate governan-
ce levels
-
At Company size (natural logarithm of total assets) +
Alav Financial Leverage: total debt on Equity -
Management Index Market P Value
ETR Level 1 0
ETR Level 2 0.0143
ETR New Market 0
CashETR Level 1 0
CashETR Level 2 0
CashETR New Market 0
Source: Prepared by the author.
Source: Prepared by the author.
Source: Prepared by the author.
The hypotheses (H1 to H6) established in this resear-
ch have corporate governance aspects as a premise, such 
as key items of tax management in Brazilian companies. 
Besides, H7 regards tax management within the prece-
ding period as reflected on tax management in the sub-
sequent period.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the corporate gover-
nance characteristics that were regarded as explanatory 
variables of the study, relating them to the expected link 
between proxies and tax management.
It is worth highlighting that, in this research, a com-
pany is regarded as efficient in tax management when it 
has a lower effective tax rate on earnings. Besides, it is 
believed that corporate governance characteristics adop-
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ted by companies influence tax management. In face of 
this, the negative signal expected means that variable is 
likely to decrease the effective tax rate of the company. On 
the other hand, the positive signal indicates that the hi-
gher this variable is, the higher the effective rate is, i.e., 
the effective rate increases according to the increase in the 
variable. 
(H2) The specific corporate governance levels on the 
BM&FBOVESPA (Level 1, Level 2, and New Market) 
have a significant negative relationship with the proxies to 
identify tax management ETR, CashETR, and BTD. 
(H3) The number of members in the Board of Directors 
in the preceding year contributes to tax management in 
firms, so the number of counselors has a significant re-
lationship with the proxies to identify tax management 
ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H4) Independent Boards of Directors are more effi-
cient concerning fiscal management, as they recommend 
the executive board to invest resources in such activities, 
so the number of independent counselors in the preceding 
year has a significant negative relationship with the pro-
xies to identify tax management ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H5) Companies with segregation between Chairman 
and CEO are more efficient concerning fiscal management, 
so this dummy has a significant negative relationship with 
the proxies to identify tax management ETR, CashETR, 
and BTD.
(H6) Companies that adopt executive board variable 
remuneration are more efficient concerning fiscal mana-
gement, so executive board remuneration has a significant 
negative relationship with the proxies to identify tax ma-
nagement ETR, CashETR, and BTD.
(H7) Tax management within the preceding period is 
reflected on tax management in the subsequent period, so 
the dependent variables to identify tax management ETR, 
CashETR, and BTD lagged one year have a significant re-
lationship with the proxies to identify tax management.
To use this methodology, first there must be establi-
shed which is the most suitable panel for data analysis. Fi-
gure 3 shows the test results.
Figure 3   Test results – identification of the panel model
Tests Hypotheses
Models
ETR (1) CashETR (2) BTD (3)
Chow
H0: The intercept is the same for all 
companies (pooling).
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F =  0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
H1: The intercept is different for all 
companies (fixed effects).
Breusch Pagan
H0: The variance of residues reflec-
ting individual differences is equal 
to zero (pooling).
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F =  0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0016
H1: The variance of residues 
reflecting individual differences is 
different from zero (random effects).
Hausman
H0: The error correction model 
(random effects) is suitable.
0.0449 0.0043 0.2217
H1: The fixed effects model is 
suitable.
Most appropriate Panel Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Source: Prepared by the author.
Based on Figure 3, it is clear that the model for panel data 
with random effects was the most suitable for data analysis 
in the BTD. However, for the ETR and CashETR the most 
suitable for data analysis is the fixed effects panel. Further-
more, models’ validation revealed, by using Wooldridge self-
-correction tests and heteroscedasticity likelihood ratio, that 
the models have problems concerning self-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. Thus, the models proposed by GLS were 
estimated by making adjustments for AR1 and heteroscedas-
ticity.
Below, the results of regressions are shown with panel 
data for the three models of this study.
4.1  Panel Data Model for the Variable ETR
In the model displayed in Table 7, we notice that tax mana-
gement within the preceding period is reflected on tax mana-
gement in the subsequent period, since the variable ETR-1 is 
statistically significant. Moreover, just as in the papers by Min-
nick and Noga (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2011), variable re-
muneration has proven to be significant before the ETR index. 
The variables corporate governance control and leverage were 
also significant, as well as the constant value in the equation.
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Table 7   Panel Data Model for the ETR – GLS
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistics P>|t|
ETR-1 0.2185358 0.0455637 4.80 0.000*
Rem -0.0013671 0.0009277 -1.47 0.001*
Comp 0.0000155 0.0000283 0.55 0.584
Indep 0.000433 0.0005494 0.79 0.431
Segr 0.0083521 0.0195102 0.43 0.669
Gc 0.0642535 0.0191871 3.35 0.001*
At -0.0008508 0.0032195 -0.26 0.792
Alav -0.000022 6.2406 -3.53 0.000*
Constante 0.1590044 0.0506975 3.14 0.002*
* Statistically significant at 1%. 
Source: Prepared by the author.
4.2   Panel Data Model for the Variable CashETR
Just as in the model in Table 7, the model in Table 8 
demonstrates that tax management within the preceding 
period is reflected on tax management in the subsequent 
period. Besides, the results shown herein are consistent 
with the papers by Minnick and Noga (2010), Dyreng et 
al. (2010), and Rego and Wilson (2010), who identified 
a significant relationship between remuneration and Ca-
shETR. In this model, no significant relationship was no-
ticed between corporate governance and the dependent 
variable. Finally, the leverage control variable was signifi-
cant, as well as the model constant value.
Table 8   Panel data model – CashETR – GLS
Table 9   Panel data model – BTD – GLS
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistics P>|t|
CASH-1    1.2806 4.0607 3.16 0.002*
Rem   -0.001713 0.0006703 -2.56 0.011*
Comp   -1.8006 0.0000511 -0.04 0.972
Indep    1.3006 0.0011589 0.00 0.999
Segr     0.024454 0.0247552 0.99 0.323
Gc   -0.012018 0.0258226 -0.47 0.642
At    0.001273 0.0023539 0.54 0.589
Alav    0.000017 4.4006 3.97 0.000*
Constante    0.209582 0.0408765 5.13 0.000*
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistics P>|t|
BTD-1 0.4062453 0.0213536 19.02 0.000*
Rem   -0.012217 0.0044779 -2.73 0.006*
Comp -368,189 1,488,941 -2.47 0.013*
Indep 2,562,706 2,392,256 1.07 0.284
Segr    106,788.4 59,079.05 1.81 0.071**
Gc   -15,923.87 59,156.1 -0.27 0.788
At    44,712.81 12,653.12 3.53 0.000*
Alav -1,605,157 2,589,215 -0.62 0.535
Constante -577,942 185,451.9 -3.12 0.002*
* Statistically significant at 1%. 
Source: Prepared by the author.
* Statistically significant at 1%. 
** Statistically significant at 7%. 
Source: Prepared by the author.
4.3   Panel Data Model for the Variable BTD
The model in Table 9, just as in previous models 
shown in tables 7 and 8, the fiscal management wi-
thin the preceding period was statistically signifi-
cant, reflecting on tax management in the subsequent 
period.
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The coefficient of variable remuneration (Rem) was 
statistically significant at 1%, just as in the other models. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that remuneration negative-
ly influences the tax management detected by means of the 
variable BTD. This finding is consistent with the papers by 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Minnick and Noga (2010), 
Dyreng et al. (2010), Rego and Wilson (2010), and Arms-
trong et al. (2011), who identified a significant relationship 
between remuneration and BTD.
Finally, H6 and H7 may be proven by the results, demons-
trating that remuneration and the previous tax manage-
ment influence the tax management detected through ETR, 
CashETR, and BTD, regardless of the fact that the company 
is classified at specific levels on the BM&FBOVESPA or at 
the traditional Market, as the control variable (Gc) was sig-
nificant only in the model in Table 6. 
5   FINAL REMARKS
The main aim of this study was checking whether cor-
porate governance characteristics, such as executive board 
remuneration, segregation between Chairman and CEO, 
and independence and composition of the Board of Direc-
tors influence tax management in Brazilian companies, as 
well as demonstrating whether previous tax management 
affects future tax management.
To meet the general objective of this study, first tax 
management was identified in Brazilian companies by 
calculating three proxies - ETR, CashETR, and BTD. Two 
main findings were identified, namely: (i) previous tax 
management influences tax management in the subse-
quent period; and (ii) remuneration may be regarded as 
a characteristic that influences tax management, just as 
in the papers by Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Minnick 
and Noga (2010), Dyreng et al. (2010), Rego and Wilson 
(2010), and Armstrong et al. (2011).
Also, the variable composition of the Board of Direc-
tors was significant only in the model analyzing the BTD. 
The control variable corporate governance was reflected 
only on the equation to analyze the ETR, and the control 
variable total assets was significant only in the equation to 
the BTD. The control variables leverage and constant value 
were significant in the models for CashETR and BTD, and 
for the ETR only constant value was significant.
Thus, this research shows that executive board variable 
remuneration is related to tax management. In this way, it 
may be concluded that a proper design of variable remu-
neration contracts may lead to an effective tax manage-
ment, with a consequent increase in company performan-
ce. Through variable remuneration and tax management, 
we may align managers’ interests to shareholders’ inte-
rests. Besides, tax management is reflected on fiscal mana-
gement in the subsequent periods.
However, both this research and the other studies cited 
on tax management are not conclusive as for the actual 
executives’ engagement in tax management, and they also 
do not make clear whether the documented tax effects are 
a by-product of investment, funding, or operational deci-
sions within the company.
Another result shows that Brazilian companies do not 
disregard the benefits of tax management, given that the 
median values of tax management proxies (ETR, CashE-
TR, and BTD) are statistically different from the nominal 
tax rate in Brazil, which was 34%. In the tests applied, it 
was demonstrated that the median value is statistically lo-
wer than the nominal rate.
A limitation of this research refers to the population 
under analysis, since it was an intentional and non-pro-
babilistic sample. In this way, the results of analyses are 
restricted to the companies under study. Of course, ge-
neralizations to another set of companies are not directly 
feasible.
It is recommended, for further research, to provide 
in-depth analysis of the strategies adopted by Brazilian 
companies to reduce taxable earnings in relation to book 
earnings, as well as to replicate the same study in compa-
nies not listed on the stock exchange. Other aspects that 
deserve to be addressed refer to the relationships between 
tax management and companies’ financial performance 
proxies, such as ROA, ROE, and EBITDA, as well as an 
assessment of the way how the stock market reacts to this 
management by analyzing market proxies, such as P/L, 
P/B, and MVA®, among others.
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